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Négy tranzíciós ország vállalati szintű adataival elemezzük a privatizáció 
hatásait az átlagbérekre és a vállalati létszámra.  Ellentétben a dolgozók 
félelmeivel, nem találunk komoly hatásokat, kivéve Oroszországban, ahol a 
privatizációnak kis negatív hatását identifikáltuk.  A külföldi privatizáció 
hatása általában pozitív.  Az elhanyagolható belföldi privatizációs hatást a 
hatékonyság- és a skálanövekedés kioltó hatásaival magyarázzuk, a 
többnyire pozitív külföldi hatást pedig azzal, hogy a skálanövekedés sokkal 
nagyobb volt, mint a szintén nagy hatékonyságnövekedés. 
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DOES PRIVATIZATION HURT WORKERS?  
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We analyze the effects of privatization on firm-level wages and employment 
in four transition economies.  Contrary to workers’ fears, our fixed effect 
and random trend estimates imply little effect of domestic privatization, 
except for a slight negative effect in Russia, and they provide some 
evidence of positive foreign effects on both wages and employment in all 
four countries.  The negligible employment impact of domestic 
privatization results from effects on efficiency and scale that are large, 
positive, but offsetting in Hungary and Romania, and from small effects of 
both types in Russia and Ukraine.  The positive employment and wage bill 
consequences of foreign ownership result from a substantial scale-
expansion effect that dominates the efficiency effect. 
 
Keywords: privatization, employment, wages, foreign ownership, 
Hungary, Romania, Russia, Ukraine 
 
JEL codes: D21, G34, J23, J31, L33, P31 
  1. INTRODUCTION 
The greatest opposition to privatizing a firm usually comes from the firm’s own 
employees, who are fearful of wage cuts and job losses.  Workers’ 
apprehensions about privatization are consistent with standard economic 
analyses, whereby new private owners reduce the firm’s labor costs in response 
to harder budget constraints and stronger profit-related incentives (e.g., Vickers 
and Yarrow, 1991; Shleifer and Vishny, 1994; Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny, 
1996; Aghion and Blanchard, 1998).  Discussions of this “efficiency effect” of 
privatization, however, implicitly assume that the firm’s output remains 
constant or at least does not increase.  But lower costs may increase the firm’s 
market share as well as total quantity demanded for the industry.  Moreover, the 
new private owners may be more entrepreneurial in marketing, innovation, and 
entering new markets (Frydman, Gray, Hessel, and Rapaczynski, 1999).  In 
such cases, the firm’s output will tend to rise, and if this “scale effect” 
dominates, then privatization could cause a net employment increase.   
The implications of privatization for wages are also ambiguous.  New owners 
may reduce wages as part of a general cost-cutting policy, and they may 
expropriate workers’ rents, similar to a hostile takeover (e.g., Shleifer and 
Summers, 1988; Gokhale, Groshen, and Neumark, 1995).  On the other hand, if 
the firm expands, it may have to offer higher wages to attract new workers.  
New private owners may also be more likely to adopt skill-biased technologies, 
resulting in a compositional shift toward higher-paid workers.  Privatized firms 
are freer to use incentive pay, which could raise wages if, for example, some 
form of efficiency wages would reduce quits or enhance effort.  Wages may 
also rise if privatization permits the firm to exercise market power and rents are 
shared with workers.  Depending on the relative strength of these factors, wages 
may either rise or fall as a result of privatization. 
Not only does theoretical analysis fail to provide definitive predictions on the 
wage and employment effects of privatization, but also the existing empirical 
evidence is quite scant.
1  Research has been hampered by small sample sizes, 
short time series, and the difficult problem of defining a comparison group of 
firms.  In the first study of effects of privatization on employment and wages, 
for example, Haskel and Szymanski (1993) analyze 14 British publicly owned 
companies, of which only four were actually privatized (the others experienced 
liberalization).  Kikeri (1998) and Birdsall and Nellis (2003) summarize a 
number of case studies and small sample surveys of privatization effects on 
labor in several developing economies.  The largest sample in the existing 
                                                 
1 The little attention to the effects of privatization on workers contrasts with the large 
literature on privatization and firm performance; see for example the surveys by Megginson 
and Netter (2001) and Djankov and Murrell (2002). 
 
 
1literature is the 170 privatized firms in Mexico studied by La Porta and Lopez-
de-Silanes (1999), although the post-privatization information is limited to a 
single year.
2  Other studies have sometimes included employment as one of 
many possible indicators of firm performance, but not the focus of analysis.
3  
Overall, the results from this small body of previous research are inconclusive, 
containing both negative and positive estimates of the effects on workers.
4
In this paper, we undertake an empirical analysis of the effects of privatization 
on the wage bill, employment, and wage rates of firms in Hungary, Romania, 
Russia, and Ukraine – where thousands of businesses were privatized in a 
relatively short period of time during the 1990s.  These four countries span the 
range of transition economies in terms of evaluations of their reforms, with 
Hungary considered one of the most successful, Russia and Ukraine among the 
                                                 
2 Lopez-de-Silanes and Chong (2003) also summarize the results from several studies of 
privatization in some Latin American countries.  In research with a different focus, Chong 
and Lopez-de-Silanes (2002) study pre-privatization retrenchment programs designed to 
increase the attractiveness of state-owned firms to potential investors. 
3 Studies of firm performance that include employment equation estimates are Megginson, 
Nash, and van Randenborgh (1994), Boubakri and Cosset (1998), D’Souza and Megginson 
(1999), Frydman, Gray, Hessel, and Rapaczynski (1999), and Lizal and Svejnar (2002); two 
of these find a positive effect of privatization on employment, two no effect, and one a 
negative effect. 
4 Another related literature examines the public sector wage differential (e.g., Gyourko and 
Tracy, 1988), where one identification approach relies on workers who switch sectors; our 
approach instead uses firms that switch sectors. 
 
 
2least successful, and Romania somewhere in the middle.
5  Figure 1 provides 
some initial evidence on the relationship of privatization and the wage bill, 
graphing the evolution of the average wage bill and percentage of firms 
privatized in our data.  At this aggregate level of analysis, a strong negative 
correlation is evident in all four countries, which would seem to corroborate 
workers’ fears and most economists’ expectations.  A number of other events 
which could affect the wage bill occurred during these years (e.g., 
macroeconomic shocks and market liberalization), however, and the firms 
selected for privatization may have been declining for extraneous reasons.  To 
deal with these potentially confounding factors and estimate the causal effects 
of privatization on workers, one must analyze microdata.
                                                 
5 The World Bank’s (1996) four-group classification of 26 transition economies, for example, 
puts Hungary in the first group of leading reformers, Romania in the second group, Russia in 
the third, and Ukraine in the last.  Similarly, the EBRD’s annual indicators of “progress in 
transition” invariably place Hungary at or close to the top of all transition economies; 
according to the overall “institutional performance” measure in EBRD (2000), Hungary is 
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Notes:  The graphs show the average real wage bill and percent of majority private firms, calculated from our data.  The real wage bill is set at 100 in 1989 in Hungary 
and 1992 for Romania, Russia, and Ukraine. 
 
 
4For this purpose, we have assembled much longer time series and more 
comprehensive coverage than was available in earlier research.  The time series 
information on manufacturing firms runs from the Communist and immediate 
post-Communist period, when all were state-owned, through 2002, well after 
most had been privatized.  The coverage of our data is quite comprehensive, 
including most manufacturing firms inherited from the former planned 
economy, both those eventually privatized and those remaining under state 
ownership.  In all four countries, we have comparable information on average 
employment and the total wage bill for each firm on an annual basis, and the 
ownership data allow us to infer the precise year in which ownership change 
occurred.  Unfortunately, the data do not contain measures of other variables 
that may have been influenced by privatization, such as worker turnover or 
fringe benefits, nor are we able to measure the fate of displaced workers, the 
origins of newly hired workers, or the prices and availability of goods.  A 
complete welfare evaluation of privatization is therefore not possible with our 
data.  The data are very well-suited, however, for investigating the effects of 
privatization on a firm’s wages and employment, essential questions for such an 
evaluation.
6
Our basic aim is to provide robust estimates of these effects using much larger 
and longer panels than were available to earlier researchers, but we also exploit 
the advantages of our data in several additional ways.  First, we are able to 
distinguish between firms privatized to foreign investors and those privatized to 
domestic companies and individuals.  Workers appear to fear foreign much 
more than domestic investors, but there is little evidence whether this perception 
is warranted.  Second, we decompose the estimated wage bill and employment 
effects of privatization into efficiency and scale effects to shed light on these 
underlying mechanisms.  Efficiency is measured alternatively as unit labor cost 
and labor productivity, and scale is measured as output for these calculations.  
Third, we investigate the dynamics of employment and wages before and after 
privatization.  Estimates of pre-privatization effects are useful for taking into 
account possible biases in the selection of firms to be privatized and for 
assessing the extent to which anticipation of privatization may affect 
employment and wage determination; indeed, some previous studies (e.g., La 
Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes, 1999; Chong and Lopez-de-Silanes, 2002) find that 
employment tends to decline in firms awaiting privatization.  The post-
privatization dynamics shed light on the speed of the changes and the long-term 
consequences experienced by employees. 
                                                 
6 This paper considers only the direct effect of privatization on a firm’s employment and 
wage, ignoring any indirect effects working through spillovers in the region, industry, or 
related industries; these would also be relevant considerations for a welfare evaluation, but 
we leave them for future research. 
 
 
5Finally, we apply econometric methods developed for dealing with selection 
bias in labor market program evaluations.  The long time series in our firm-level 
data permit us to estimate regression models including not only firm fixed 
effects but also firm-specific time trends, sometimes referred to as “random 
trend models.”
7  These models control not only for fixed differences among 
firms but also differing trend growth rates that may affect the probability of 
privatization and whether the new owners are domestic or foreign investors.  
We compare alternative estimators using several specification tests, including 
variants of the Heckman-Hotz (1989) “pre-program” test which measures 
selection bias under an estimator as the difference in the dependent variable 
prior to treatment between the treated and comparison groups.  In the 
privatization context, this test must be evaluated before the privatization year to 
avoid possible contamination through anticipatory effects. 
The next section describes our data for each of the four countries, and Section 3 
discusses their privatization programs.  Section 4 explains the estimation 
procedures, and Section 5 presents the results.  Conclusions are summarized in 
Section 6. 
 
2. DATA  
Our analysis draws upon annual data for most of the manufacturing firms 
inherited from the socialist period in each of the four countries we study.  The 
sources and variables are quite similar across countries.  The State Committees 
for Statistics in Russia and Ukraine (Goskomstat in Russia and Derzhkomstat in 
Ukraine) are the successors to the branches of the corresponding Soviet State 
Committee.  They compile the basic databases for our analysis in these 
countries, the annual industrial enterprise registries.  These are supplemented by 
joint venture registries that are available in Russia and a database from the State 
Property Committee in Ukraine, which we have linked together across years.  
The industrial registries are supposed to include all industrial firms with more 
than 100 employees plus those that are more than 25 percent owned by the state 
and/or by legal entities that are themselves included in the registry.  In fact, the 
practice seems to be that once firms enter the registries, they continue to report 
even if the original conditions for inclusion are no longer satisfied.  The data 
may therefore be taken as corresponding to the “old” sector of firms (and their 
                                                 
7 Ashenfelter and Card (1985) and Heckman and Hotz (1989) use the random trend model in 
evaluating training programs, while Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993, 2005) apply it to 
the effects of job displacement and community college on wages.  Brown, Earle, and Telegdy 
(2006) estimate random trend models of the effect of privatization on multifactor productivity 
in Hungary, Romania, Russia, and Ukraine.  To our knowledge, however, no other study of 
privatization, corporate governance, or firm performance has used this method. 
 
 
6successors) that were inherited from the Soviet system.  Certainly with respect 
to this set of firms, the databases are quite comprehensive. 
The Russian and Ukrainian databases include the years 1989 and 1992-2002.
8  
Employment in Russia in all years and in Ukraine from 1989 to 2000 is defined 
as the average number of registered employees in industrial production 
divisions of the enterprise; this definition includes non-production workers but 
excludes employees in “nonindustrial divisions,” most of which provide 
employee benefits.  Although information on the size of these divisions is scant, 
by all accounts they tend to be very small fractions of total firm employment.  
In Ukraine, the available employment variable includes employees in all 
divisions in the years 2001 and 2002.  The wage variable in Russia in all years 
and in Ukraine for 1992-1999 refers to the wage bill for registered employees of 
industrial divisions, including both monetary and in-kind accrued payments (the 
latter valued at “market prices”), divided by employment.  For 2000-2002, the 
Ukrainian concept covers all employees.  Wages in both cases are deflated by 
national consumer price indices. 
  The Hungarian and Romanian data tend to be more similar to each other 
than to those in the Soviet successor states.  The basic data sources are the 
National Tax Authority in Hungary and the Ministry of Finance in Romania, 
which provide data for all legal entities engaged in double-sided bookkeeping.  
In addition, the Romanian data are supplemented by the National Institute for 
Statistics’ enterprise registry and the State Ownership Fund’s portfolio data.   
The Hungarian data are available for 1986-2002, the Romanian for 1992-2002.  
The employment definitions in both cases refer to average employment over a 
year, and wages are defined as the annual wage bill (including monetary and 
non-monetary benefits) for all employees divided by employment.  Again, they 
are deflated by national consumer prices. 
In order to make the samples comparable across countries, some truncation of 
the Hungarian and Romanian data was necessary.  Firms are included if at first 
observation they operate in an industrial sector, because the Russian and 
Ukrainian data do not include non-industrial firms, and they appear to also 
exclude industrial firms that were classified as non-industrial when they first 
appeared.  In all four countries, the data are restricted to manufacturing (NACE 
15-36) because some of the nonmanufacturing industrial sectors (chiefly 
mining) are defined noncomparably in the Russian and Ukrainian classification 
system (OKONKh).
9  We include only “old” firms, defined as existing prior to 
1992 (1990 in Hungary) or state-owned at first observation, both because the 
                                                 
8 The Russian employment data also include 1985-1988 and 1990-1991, but wages are 
unavailable in those years.  We use a consistent sample across equations, but the results are 
quite similar with the full employment sample in Russia. 




7Russian and Ukrainian data do not cover most de novo firms, and because de 
novo firms are not at risk of privatization.  In addition, privatized firms are 
included only if they are majority state in their first observation in the 
regressions, so that the base category consists exclusively of state firms.
10
The total number of firms and their total employment in 1994, as a fraction of 
all old firms and their corresponding employment, are shown in Table 1.   
Missing values do not reduce the sample greatly in any country, and we have no 
reason to expect that the sample is biased in any particular direction.  The 
numbers of firms appearing in the samples are 2,388 in Hungary, 2,475 in 
Romania, 18,578 in Russia, and 5,976 in Ukraine.  A total of 229,574 firm-
years are available for analysis. Among privatized firms, an average of 3.7 
Hungarian, 5.4 Romanian, 2.9 Russian, and 6.3 Ukrainian observations per firm 
are included pre-privatization, and 7.9 Hungarian, 4.8 Romanian, 5.3 Russian, 
and 4.1 Ukrainian observations per firm are included post-privatization.  
Table 1  
Sample Sizes, 1994 
 
 Number  of 
firms  
Percent of 
all old firms 
Total 
employment 
Percent of old 
firm employment 
Hungary  1,541 66.6  318,343 73.3 
Romania 2,061  84.0  1,978,895 96.2 
Russia 14,377  92.4  10,238,688 96.5 
Ukraine 5,645  96.5  3,358,955 98.1 
Note: The table shows the number of manufacturing firms available for analysis 
and their total employment in 1994 as a percentage of the set of all old firms 
(manufacturing firms inherited from the socialist period) and the total 
employment of that set of firms, respectively. 
Table 2 provides summary statistics for employment and wages.  The data 
imply that average employment size has declined substantially in all four 
economies (although most in Romania).  Real wages have increased in Hungary 
and Romania and fallen in Russia and Ukraine.  
                                                 
10 In Russia and Ukraine, privatization started only after 1992, so firms that existed before 
this year in our data must be old.  Romanian privatization started in 1992, so the old sample is 
not reduced by the lack of data in earlier years.  
 
 
8Table 2  
Mean Employment and Wage in the First Year of Analysis, 1994, and 2002 
 
 Employment    Wage 
 First  year  1994  2002    First year  1994  2002 
613.7 206.6  165.3  981.6 1,344.7  1,518.0  Hungary 
(1,214.7) (594.1)  (422.9)  (352.9)  (930.5)  (1,896.3) 
1234.0 960.2  414.3  60,847.6  52,121.8  69,920.5  Romania 
(2,169.9)    (2,258.3)  (924.1)  (25,172.5)  (22,946.2)  (483,597) 
621.4 712.2  506.6  65,814.2  44,343.5  40,168.7  Russia 
(1296.2) (2277.0)  (1999.4)  (16,826.7)  (23,402.3)  (24,503.4) 
805.2 595.0  472.0  9,516.6  6,193.0  6,708.8  Ukraine    (1,863.9)    (1,524.2)   (1,901.1)  (1,603.4)  (2,951.1)  (5,819.7) 
Note:  The first year of analysis is 1986 in Hungary, 1992 in Romania, and 1989 in 
Russia and Ukraine. Wage is annual, expressed in constant 2002 prices (thousands of 
HUF for Hungary, thousands of ROL for Romania, RUB for Russia, and UAH for 
Ukraine).  Precise definitions and sources are provided in the data appendix.  Standard 
deviations are shown in parentheses.  NA = not available. 
These data have been extensively cleaned to remove inconsistencies and to 
improve longitudinal linkages that may have been broken due to change of firm 
identifier from one year to the next (associated with reorganizations and 
changes of legal form, for instance).  The inconsistencies were evaluated using 
information from multiple sources (including not only separate data providers, 
but also previous year information available in Romanian balance sheets and 
Russian and Ukrainian registries).  One type of measurement error, the under-
reporting of wages to avoid taxes and social security contributions, could be 
especially important for our analysis.  Discussions with knowledgable observers 
in these countries suggest that while under-reporting is a common problem in 
small service sector firms, however, it is unlikely to be a very serious problem 
in our samples of medium and large manufacturing firms because of the 
cumbersomeness of paying large numbers of employees under the table.  The 
discussions also indicate that to the extent under-reporting in these firms does 
occur, it is most likely to happen in firms that are privatized to domestic 
owners; state-owned firms are subject to tight controls and have fewer 
incentives to avoid taxes, while foreign-owned firms, especially larger ones like 
those in our samples, are less likely to engage in this practice.  This implies that 
our estimates of the wage effects of domestic privatization will if anything be 
 
 
9downward-biased, so that an estimated effect of zero (or slightly negative) 
might reflect a true effect that is positive.
11
Finally, the longitudinal linkages in the databases were improved using all 
available information, including industry, region, size, multiple sources for the 
same financial variables, and some exact linking variables (e.g., firm names and 
addresses in all countries except Hungary, where this information was not 
available) to match firms that exited in a given year with those that entered in 
the following year.
12  Although this issue has not received much attention in 
previous research, it is clear that accurate and complete links are crucial to any 
identification strategy such as ours that requires observations both before and 
after privatization.  In some cases, however, it proved impossible to link large 
apparent exits and entries across years, and we have little doubt that even after 
all of our efforts that the links are still incomplete.  This data problem is 
common in longitudinal data, and it motivates us to carry out a separate analysis 
of the relationship between privatization and exit behavior, in order to assess 
how significantly this may qualify our analysis.  Before describing these 
methods, however, we first provide a brief description of privatization policies 
and ownership outcomes. 
 
3. PRIVATIZATION POLICIES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 
The methods and tempos of large enterprise privatization differed quite 
significantly across the four countries we study in this paper.  Hungary got off 
to an early start in ownership transformation and maintained a consistent case-
by-case method throughout the transition.  At the very beginning, the 
transactions tended to be “spontaneous,” initiated by managers, who were also 
usually the beneficiaries, sometimes in combination with foreign or other 
investors (Voszka, 1993).  From 1991, the sales process became more 
regularized, generally relying upon competitive tenders open to foreign 
participation, although management usually still had control over the process.  
Unlike many other countries, there were no significant preferences given to 
workers to acquire shares in their companies, nor was there a mass distribution 
of shares aided by vouchers.  Hungarian privatization thus resulted in very little 
                                                 
11 Our wage variable represents accrued obligations to employees, and another potential form 
of bias could result from differential wage arrears across ownership types.  Studies of arrears 
find little difference between state-owned firms and those privatized domestically (e.g., Earle 
and Sabirianova, 2002), suggesting little bias in that comparison.  The evidence on foreign-
owned firms is scant, but if foreign employers are less likely to have arrears, then their actual 
paid wages would be relatively understated – implying a downward bias on the estimated 
foreign wage effect. 
12 In Hungary, we also used a separate Central Statistical Office dataset with information on 
reorganizations that broke links across years. 
 
 
10worker ownership (involving only about 250 firms), very little dispersed 
ownership, and instead significant managerial ownership and highly 
concentrated blockholdings, many of them foreign (Frydman et al., 1993a).   
Although the process appeared at times to be slow and gradual, in fact it was 
completed earlier than in most other East European countries. 
In Romania, by contrast, the early attempts to mimic voucher programs and to 
sell individual firms produced few results, and privatization really began only in 
late 1993, first with the program of Management and Employee Buyouts, and 
secondly with the mass privatization of 1995-96 (Earle and Telegdy, 1998).  
The consequences of these programs were large-scale employee ownership and 
dispersed shareholding by the general population, with little foreign 
involvement.  Beginning in 1997, foreign investors became more involved, and 
blocks of shares were sold to both foreigners and domestic entities (Earle and 
Telegdy, 2002).  The result was a mixture of several types of ownership and a 
moderate speed compared to Hungary. 
Russia and Ukraine’s earliest privatization experiences have some similarities to 
the “spontaneous” period in Hungary, as the central planning system dissolved 
in the late 1980s and decision-making power devolved to managers and work 
collectives.  The provisions for leasing enterprise assets (with eventual buyout) 
represented the first organized transactions in 1990-1992, but the big impetus 
for most industrial enterprise privatization in Russia was the mass privatization 
from October 1992 to June 1994, when most shares were transferred primarily 
to the concerned firms’ managers and workers, who had received large 
discounts in the implicit prices they faced (Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1995).  
Some shares (generally 29 percent) were reserved for voucher auctions open to 
any participant, and these resulted in a variety of ownership structures, from 
dispersed outsiders holding their shares through voucher investment funds to 
domestic investors who acquired significant blocks; sometimes managers and 
workers acquired more shares through this means, but there were few cases of 
foreign investment.  Blockholding and foreign ownership became more 
significant through later sales of blocks of shares and through secondary trading 
that resulted in concentration.  Ukraine followed Russia’s pattern at a somewhat 
slower pace.  In both countries, the initial consequence was large-scale 
ownership by managers and workers and some blockholding by domestic 
entities.  Subsequently, privatization through sales became more common, 
secondary trading increased concentration, and foreigners made partial inroads. 
These general patterns are reflected in Table 3, which contains our 
computations of private ownership, defined here as a strict majority of shares 
held in private hands, based on our regression samples.
13  Ownership is 
                                                 
13 The Russian data do not contain an ownership variable prior to 1993, nor, unlike the other 
countries, do they distinguish between minority and majority shares.  But virtually all the 
 
 
11measured at the reporting date, the end of each calendar year.  Privatization is 
therefore measured as a change in ownership type from the end of one year to 
the end of the next.  As of late 1992, 36.4 percent of the Hungarian firms had 
already been privatized, while privatization had not yet started in Romania, 
Russia, and Ukraine.  By the end of the period, most firms had been privatized 
in all four countries, although there remain enough state-owned firms in each 




Percentage of Firms Privatized – 
Majority Private and Majority Foreign 
 
 1992  1994  2002 
Hungary      
 Private  36.4  90.3  93.2 
 Foreign  4.7  13.5  15.8 
Romania      
 Private  0.0  4.7  84.6 
 Foreign  0.0  0.1  5.3 
Russia      
 Private  0.0  79.5  70.0 
 Foreign  0.0  0.4  0.4 
Ukraine      
 Private  0.0  7.9  81.3 
 Foreign  0.0  0.1  1.5 
 
Note:  “Private” refers to firms with more than 
50% privately held shares. “Foreign” refers to 
privatized firms with more than 50% foreign-
owned shares. The residual category consists of 
privatized firms that are not majority foreign; 
most of these are majority-owned by domestic 
private owners, but some of them also have 
minority foreign ownership.   
 
                                                                                                                                                        
privatizations in our data are mass privatizations (not lease buyouts), so the earliest they 
could have taken place was October 1992, and other sources suggest that nearly all of these 
led to majority private ownership (see, e.g., Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1995). 
14 We assume a single change of ownership and recoded cases of multiple switches to the 
modal category after the first change (ties were decided in favor of private and foreign, unless 
only two years of data were available).  In Hungary there were 71 cases, in Romania 15, and 
in Ukraine 4.  Russia had 2,811 firms private since 1995 reclassified as state in 2000 or 2001, 
when ownership codes changed drastically; such mass renationalization did not occur, so our 
recoding corrects this problem.  The nonmonotonicity of percent privatized in Table 3 is due 
to split-ups of state-owned firms. 
 
 
12The table also contains the percentage of firms majority privatized to 
foreigners.
15  This fraction is by far the highest in Hungary, reaching nearly 16 
percent of all entities by the end of our observation period.  In Romania, the 
percentage reaches 5 percent, in Ukraine 1.5 percent, and in Russia just 0.4 
percent.  Given our sample sizes, these are sufficient to estimate coefficients.  
The residual category – the difference between private and foreign – consists of 
majority privatized firms that are not majority foreign.  Because foreign 
investment in these countries usually takes the form of controlling investments, 
the residual firms are therefore usually majority owned by domestic private 
groups, and we label them “domestic” in the discussion below.  But some cases 
of minority foreign investment (particularly in Hungary) are also included in 
this category. 
The cross-country differences in privatization policy design could affect the 
measured impact of privatization on employment and wages.  As we discussed 
in the introduction, two mechanisms may affect the firm’s employment and 
wage setting:  efficiency and scale effects.  Worker-owners are likely to oppose 
labor-saving restructuring, and they are unlikely to have incentives or resources 
to expand output (Bonin, Jones, and Putterman, 1993).  Outside blockholders, 
on the other hand, should favor cost-saving restructuring, particularly foreign 
investors with access to management skills, new technologies, and financing.  
These new owners are also more likely to respond to opportunities for 
expansion.  Outsiders with small shareholdings may also benefit from efficiency 
improvements and scale expansion, but they are unlikely to influence the firm’s 
behavior.  Therefore, both the efficiency and scale effects of privatization are 
likely to be smallest for domestic owners in countries where insider and mass 
privatization predominated, larger in cases where domestic outsiders acquired 
blocks of shares, and largest for privatization to foreign investors.  Because 
these mechanisms are offsetting, however, the relative magnitudes of the effects 
of different types of privatization on workers are ambiguous. 
 
4. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
We follow the broader literature on the effects of privatization in estimating 
reduced form equations, while trying to account for potential problems of 
heterogeneity and simultaneity bias (Djankov and Murrell, 2002; Megginson 
and Netter, 2001).  A structural approach considering employment and wages as 
joint outcomes would be useful for some purposes, including for estimating 
                                                 
15 The Russian registries contain codes for state, domestic, joint ventures, and 100 percent 
foreign firms, but foreign shares are available only for a subset of firms in four years.  We 
classify all joint ventures as foreign, but the results are very similar if we include only those 
foreign firms with a majority foreign share in at least one of the four years. 
 
 
13changes in labor demand elasticities associated with privatization, but it raises 
thorny simultaneity issues, and thus we leave this for future research.  The 
reduced form approach is a simpler starting point for gathering evidence on the 
possible effects of ownership change. 
Estimating these effects nevertheless faces some potential problems.  The first is 
the possibility that aggregate shocks may affect employment, wages, and 
ownership.  Studies that estimate a privatization effect as the difference between 
pre- and post-privatization levels for a sample of privatized firms (e.g., 
Megginson, Nash, and van Randenborgh, 1994) are unable to distinguish the 
effect of privatization from such aggregate fluctuations.  Moreover, the shocks 
may be industry-specific, and the available deflators may not perfectly capture 
price changes.  Yet most studies have too few observations at their disposal to 
be able to account for industry-specific fluctuations, which if correlated with 
privatization may produce biased estimates.  Taking advantage of the large 
samples in our data, we include a full set of industry-year interactions to control 
for such factors.  Unlike most previous studies, our data also contain a 
comparison group of firms that remain in state ownership throughout the period 
of observation. 
A more difficult problem is the possibility of selection bias in the privatization 
process.  Politicians, investors, and employees of the firms may all influence 
whether a firm is privatized, and whether the new owners are domestic or 
foreign.  Politicians concerned with unemployment may prefer to retain firms 
with the worst prospects in state ownership in order to protect workers from 
layoffs and wage cuts, and the employees themselves may work to prevent 
privatization in such cases.  Potential investors are also likely to be most 
interested in purchasing firms with better prospects.  To remove such time-
invariant differences across firms, we therefore include firm fixed effects (FE) 
in some specifications.  Since firms could also differ in their trend growth rates, 
we estimate some specifications including firm-specific trends (FE&FT). 
The final estimation problem involves ambiguities in timing, both in the precise 
date of privatization (sometime in the year between observation dates) and in 
how long it takes for any effects to emerge.  We address these issues by 
investigating the dynamics of the effect before and after the privatization year.  
Examining the pre-privatization dynamics provides information on whether 
firms were already adjusting employment and wages prior to the ownership 
change.  Such anticipatory effects seem most likely to be negative, particularly 
if the expectation of post-privatization loss of control – or of job – leads to 
increased asset stripping by managers.
16  As discussed in more detail below, we 
                                                 
16 This argument is made by Aghion, Blanchard, and Burgess (1994).  Roland and Sekkat 
(2000) conclude that good managers will restructure their companies prior to privatization.  
 
 
14conduct specification tests of whether the inclusion of firm fixed effects or both 
firm fixed effects and firm-specific trends can help control for this selection 
bias. 
The basic specification for the panel data model takes the following form for 
each country separately: 
 y it = Djtγjt + wtαi  + θitδ + uit,         ( 1 )  
where i indexes firms from 1 to N, j indexes industries from 1 to J, and t indexes 
time periods (years) from 1 to T.
17  In alternative specifications, yit is the natural 
logarithm of the firm’s wage bill, employment, and average wage rate (per 
worker); because the ln(wage bill) is the sum of the other two variables, the 
linearity of our estimators implies that the coefficients on all independent 
variables also sum across equations.  Djt  is a 1 x JT vector of industry-year 
interaction dummies; γjt is the associated JT  x 1 vector of coefficients; and uit is 
an idiosyncratic error.
18  The dimensions of the other terms in the equation vary 
across specifications:  wt  is a vector of aggregate time variables, αi is the vector 
of associated individual-specific slopes, θit is the vector of ownership measures, 
and δ are the ownership effects of interest in this paper.  In the OLS regressions 
wt ≡ 0.  In the FE regressions wt ≡ 1, so that αi ≡ αi is the unobserved effect.  
The FE&FT model specifies wt ≡ (1, t), so that αi ≡ (α1i, α2i), where α1i is a fixed 
unobserved effect and α2i is the random trend for firm i.  In practice, the FE&FT 
model is estimated in two steps, the first detrending all variables for each firm 
separately and the second estimating the model on the detrended data.  Standard 
errors in the second step are adjusted for the loss of degrees of freedom 
associated with detrending. 
We investigate three alternative specifications of the ownership variables θit.  
The simplest uses a single post-program dummy Privateit-1, defined = 1 if the 
firm is majority privately owned at the end of the previous year.
19  T h e  
coefficient of interest δ is then the mean within-country-industry-year difference 
                                                                                                                                                        
La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes (1999) find negative anticipatory effects in their study of 
Mexican privatization. 
17 J=10 industries, which we have chosen based on the trade-off between disaggregation and 
number of observations, specifying a minimum of 50 observations per year per country for 
each industry.  T varies by country:  17 in Hungary, 11 in Romania, and 12 in Russia and 
Ukraine. 
18 Our estimates permit general within-firm correlation of residuals using Arellano’s (1987) 
clustering method.  The standard errors of all our test statistics are robust to both serial 
correlation and heteroskedasticity.  See Kézdi (2003) for a detailed analysis of 
autocorrelation and the robust cluster estimator in panel data models. 
19 Privatization is inferred in our data when a firm changes status from the end of one year to 
the next.  This implies that the date the new owners acquire formal authority (e.g., the first 
post-privatization shareholders’ meeting) varies across firms, with some early in the final pre-
privatization year.  But the first “post” year must somehow be defined, and we discuss this 
issue further in connection with the dynamics of the effect below. 
 
 
15in the dependent variable between firms majority private and majority state-
owned.  A second specification disaggregates ownership by nationality of the 
new private owners so that θit ≡ (Domesticit-1, Foreignit-1), and δ ≡ (δd , δf ) are 
the parameters of interest.  Third, we estimate dynamic specifications, where 
dummy variables for the years before and after privatization are interacted with 
indicators for whether the firm is ever domestically privatized or foreign 
privatized.  Designating τ as the index of event time, the number of years since 
privatization, so that τ < 0 in the pre-privatization years, τ = 0 in the year in 
which ownership change occurs, and τ > 0 in the post-privatization years, then 
θit ≡ (Domesticitτ, Foreignitτ), δ ≡ (δτd, δτf), and τ = -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3+, where 3+ 
is three and more years after privatization.  We assume that privatization has no 
effect until 2 years before the ownership change appears in our data, so that δτd 
= δτf = 0 for τ < -2. 
We implement specification tests to help determine whether the OLS, FE, or 
FE&FT models are more appropriate.  Our method generalizes the Heckman-
Hotz (1989) “pre-program” test, which requires the same conditional 
expectation of the outcome for both treated and control groups in a single pre-
treatment period.  The assumption is that, once the test is satisfied, the only 
cause of differences between the two groups after that period is the treatment 
itself.  We carry out F tests for the joint significance of the τ = -2 and τ = -1 
dummies and t tests on the τ = -2 dummies in the dynamic specifications.  The F 
tests address Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith’s (1999) concern that if a shock 
close to the treatment date affects one group but not the other, then the results 
will be highly sensitive to the choice of pre-treatment period.  Studying each 
available pre-privatization year avoids this pitfall and does not require any a 
priori assumptions on which year is most appropriate.  The t tests on the τ = -2 
dummies avoid the possibility that the τ = -1 dummies display anticipatory 
effects of privatization.  In addition to the pre-program test, we conduct F tests 
on the joint probability that all FEs = 0, and on the joint probability that all FTs 
= 0 in regressions with a single post-dummy for privatization.  Finally, we 
conduct Hausman-type specification tests of the differences in the entire vector 
of coefficients resulting from adding FEs to the OLS specification, and from 
adding FTs to the FE specification. 
To provide diagnostic information about the direction and magnitude of 
possible selection bias in the data, we estimate other variants of equation (1).  
Here we restrict the sample to state-owned firms (either never or not yet 
privatized, so that the single post dummy variable Privateit-1 = 0 in this sub-
sample), and we set wt ≡ 0.  θit ≡ Pre-Privateit in one specification, and θit ≡ 
(Pre-Domesticit, Pre-Foreignit) in another.  We retain the full set of industry-
year interactions, Djt, so that all effects are measured within industry-year cells.  
Under these assumptions, wage bill, employment, and wage differences 
 
 
16between firms never privatized and those privatized in the future can be 
estimated from the equation  
 y it = Djtγjt + θitδ + uit.          ( 2 )  
In order to assess the relative importance of the efficiency and scale effects of 
privatization, we decompose the employment changes by estimating 
specifications of equation (1) where the dependent variables are the natural 
logarithms of output and labor productivity (output divided by employment); 
and we similarly decompose the wage bill changes by estimation equations with 
unit labor cost (the wage bill divided by output) and output.  Linearity of the 
estimators implies that the estimated wage bill effect of privatization is equal to 
the output effect minus the unit labor cost effect, the former measuring the scale 
of the firm, and the latter the efficiency effect.  The employment effect of 
privatization can be decomposed analogously, with labor productivity serving as 
the efficiency measure.  In these regressions, ownership is parameterized as 
single post-dummies for domestic and foreign privatization.  FE and FE&FT 
models are estimated, and industry-year effects are included as controls. 
The final estimation issue, which is relevant to all of these methods and all 
previous research on this topic, concerns the use of information only on 
reporting firms.  A difficult problem is how to handle exit because, as discussed 
in Section 2, the permanent disappearance of a firm from the data may represent 
a genuine shutdown or merely a change in name or legal form or some type of 
reorganization.  In the former case, it would be desirable to count these as job 
losses, while in the latter, it would not.  Despite extensive cleaning of the 
longitudinal linkages, we can distinguish shut-downs from reregistrations and 
boundary changes only imperfectly.  To assess the potential of such exits to 
influence our results, however, we estimate probit equations similar in form to 
(1) except that the dependent variable is a dummy for exit (=1 if the firm exits) 
and industry and year dummies are included separately rather than as 
interactions with industry (because many industry-year cells contain no exits).  
The next section reports the results. 
 
5. RESULTS 
We begin the analysis by exploring pre-privatization differences in wages and 
employment between firms that are eventually privatized and those that remain 
state-owned.  Table 4 shows results from the estimates of Equation (2), where 
the sample contains firm-year observations when the firm is state owned.  The 
estimated differences vary greatly across countries, ownership types, and 
dependent variables.  Romanian and Hungarian firms that are domestically 
privatized by the end of the period tend to have much smaller wage bills than 
the average always state-owned firm, but the pre-domestic effect on the wage 
 
 
17bill is positive in Russia and Ukraine.  Pre-privatization employment shows a 
very similar pattern to the wage bill, except that the magnitude of the 
coefficients is smaller in each of the countries, except in the case of Romania.  
Wages, however, tend to be larger in firms to be privatized everywhere but for 
domestic firms in Hungary.  The foreign results are much more consistent, as 
firms that will be foreign-owned have higher wage bills, employment, and wage 
rates than either pre-domestic firms or always state firms in all four countries. 
 
Table 4  
Pre-Privatization Relative Wage Bill, Employment, and Wage 
 
 Hungary  Romania  Russia  Ukraine 
  Wage Bill
 Pre  Private  -0.605** -0.098  0.830**  0.227** 
  (0.081) (0.090) (0.024) (0.042) 
 Pre  Domestic  -0.714** -0.190*  0.827**  0.213** 
  (0.081) (0.090) (0.024) (0.042) 
 Pre  Foreign  0.361* 0.976**  1.342**  1.038** 
  (0.167) (0.162) (0.136) (0.184) 
  Employment
 Pre  Private  -0.582** -0.154  0.722**  0.186** 
  (0.080) (0.082) (0.021) (0.037) 
 Pre  Domestic  -0.678** -0.243**  0.720**  0.175** 
  (0.080) (0.082) (0.021) (0.037) 
 Pre  Foreign  0.263 0.791**  1.199**  0.837** 
  (0.179) (0.142) (0.127) (0.154) 
  Wage
 Pre  Private  -0.023 0.065**  0.107**  0.041** 
  (0.019) (0.019) (0.010) (0.014) 
 Pre  Domestic  0.036 0.053**  0.107**  0.038** 
  (0.019) (0.019) (0.010) (0.014) 
 Pre  Foreign  0.099* 0.185**  0.143**  0.201** 
  (0.041) (0.035) (0.038) (0.067) 
   N  8,593 13,481  69,294  40,676 
 
Note:  The pre-privatization characteristics of firms subsequently privatized relative to 
enterprises always in state ownership are estimated as the coefficients on a group effect, 
Ever Private, in regressions also including industry-year interactions.  The Ever Foreign 
and Ever Domestic effects are estimated analogously in equations disaggregating Private 
into Foreign and Domestic. Standard errors (corrected for firm clustering) are shown in 
parentheses. * = significant at 5-percent level.  ** = significant at 1-percent level.  
 
 
18The results from estimating relation (1) with the natural log of the wage bill as 
the dependent variable are displayed in Table 5.  Equations are fitted by OLS, 
fixed firm effect (FE), and firm-specific trends (FE&FT).  Starting with the 
specification estimating the average post-privatization effect (Privateit-1), the 
OLS estimates of δp are negative in Hungary, positive in Russia and Ukraine, 
and essentially zero in Romania.  Controlling for FEs and FTs changes the 
estimates dramatically: each significant coefficient drops close to zero, while 
the Romanian becomes large and significant in the FE but drops to –0.015 and 
loses significance in the FE&FT.  The FE&FT coefficient is essentially zero in 
Hungary and Ukraine, and close to zero although negative in Russia.  These 
results therefore imply that privatization has had little effect on the wage bill.  If 
the wage bill represents a summary indicator of worker welfare, our firm-level 
analysis does not support the common belief that privatization hurt workers.  
Turning to the distinction between domestic and foreign ownership, the 
domestic results tend to be similar to the private results, as domestic owners 
dominate in most privatized companies.  The OLS estimates of δd are negative 
in Hungary and Romania and positive in Russia and Ukraine, but again the 
coefficients are reduced in magnitude when the FEs and FTs are included.  The 
main exception is Romania, where as with δp, the FE estimate is positive and the 
FE&FT is essentially zero.  In Hungary, the domestic wage bill effect is 
negative although small (about –0.05) and statistically insignificant in both the 
FE and FE&FT specifications.  Foreign-owned firms account for only very 
small fractions of the observations in Russia and Ukraine, so the estimates of δd  
and δp are nearly identical. 
By contrast, the estimated effects of foreign privatization in Table 5 are large, 
positive, and highly significant in the OLS and FE specifications in all four 
countries, the FE coefficients varying between 0.396 and 0.735.  When trends 
are added, the coefficients fall, but they remain positive in all four countries.  
They remain statistically significantly different from zero in Hungary and 
Romania, while in Russia and Ukraine they are imprecisely estimated, probably 
due to the small number of foreign firms in those countries.  In any case, our 
results provide no support for the widespread fear of foreign owners; on the 
contrary, they provide strong evidence that foreign owners increased the wage 
bill in the two Central and East European countries in our study, and in the two 




Table 5  
Estimated Wage Bill Effects of Privatization 
 
 Hungary  Romania  Russia  Ukraine 
OLS Private
  δ ˆ p -0.431** -0.065  0.850**  0.146** 
  (0.068) (0.065) (0.027) (0.038) 
R
2 0.165 0.181 0.358 0.309 
FE    
  δ ˆ p 0.038 0.187**  -0.052**  0.026 
  (0.032) (0.027) (0.012) (0.015) 
R
2 0.293 0.466 0.478 0.586 
FE&FT 
  δ ˆ p -0.008 -0.015 -0.026**  -0.008 
  (0.023) (0.019) (0.008) (0.013) 
R
2 0.080 0.430 0.194 0.285 
OLS  Domestic and Foreign
  δ ˆ d -0.657** -0.127*  0.844**  0.134** 
  (0.069) (0.066) (0.027) (0.038) 
  δ ˆ f  0.848** 1.396** 1.823** 1.079** 
 (0.122)  (0.136)  (0.203)  (0.252) 
Pr(δ ˆ f = δ ˆ d )  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
FE 
  δ ˆ d -0.056 0.164**  -0.054**  0.020 
 (0.034)  (0.027)  (0.012)  (0.015) 
  δ ˆ f  0.735** 0.520** 0.396** 0.439** 
 (0.066)  (0.084)  (0.083)  (0.141) 
Pr(δ ˆ f = δ ˆ d ) 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.003 
FE&FT 
  δ ˆ d -0.044 -0.024 -0.027**  -0.010 
 (0.024)  (0.020)  (0.008)  (0.013) 
  δ ˆ f  0.220** 0.116*  0.062  0.109 
 (0.052)  (0.057)  (0.074)  (0.122) 
Pr(δ ˆ f = δ ˆ d )  0.000 0.020 0.231 0.334 
N  19,382 22,447 131,531 56,214 
 
Note:  Full sets of unrestricted industry-year dummies are included in the regressions.  
Private = 1 if the firm is majority private at end of year t-1.  FE=specification including 
firm fixed effects; FT= all variables have been detrended using individual firm trends.  
Standard errors (corrected for firm clustering and for loss of degrees of freedom in the 
FE&FT specification) are shown in parentheses.  R
2 is the second-stage R
2 for FE&FT.  
* = significant at 5-percent level. ** = significant at 1-percent level. 
The difference between the domestic and foreign effects is highly statistically 
significant except in the Russian and Ukrainian specifications with firm-specific 
trends.  In the remainder of the paper, we display only specifications with the 
 
 
20domestic/foreign disaggregation, since the two ownership types clearly behave 
quite differently.
20
We next decompose the wage bill effect into its component parts in Table 6.  
Again, while the OLS estimates are usually large in magnitude and highly 
significant, the coefficients tend to be much smaller and less significant in the 
FE and FE&FT specifications.  In Hungary, Russia, and Ukraine, domestic 
ownership has essentially no effect on employment.  The only large (positive) 
effect is measured for Romanian employment in the FE specification, but it 
becomes small and negative when FTs are added.  In Hungary and Russia, 
domestic privatization is estimated to reduce wages by about 3–5 percentage 
points.  In Romania, the FE specification also shows a small negative effect, but 
the coefficient is statistically insignificant, and it is even closer to zero when 
FTs are added.
21  In Ukraine, the wage effect is zero in both specifications. 
Foreign ownership effects are estimated to be positive for both employment and 
wages in every specification and in every country.  The magnitudes are large 
and highly statistically significant in all OLS and FE specifications, and they 
remain so in the FE&FT for employment in Hungary and for wages in Hungary 
and Romania.   
                                                 
20 The results from estimating the change in the wage bill from two years before to two years 
after privatization imply substantial negative effects of both foreign and domestic 
privatization in all countries (except for foreign privatization in Hungary).  This approach 
controls for fixed heterogeneity across privatized firms (by differencing).  But it does not use 
the state-owned control group, nor does it control for aggregate time effects, industry-specific 
shocks, or firm-specific trends. 
21 As discussed in Section 2, wage under-reporting is more likely to occur in firms privatized 
domestically that in those remaining state-owned or sold to foreign investors (where such 
under-reporting appears to be uncommon), which would imply that our small negative 




Estimated Employment and Wage Effects  
of Domestic and Foreign Privatization 
 
 Hungary  Romania  Russia  Ukraine 
OLS Employment 
δ ˆ d -0.621** -0.176**  0.764** 0.080** 
  (0.067) (0.060) (0.022) (0.029) 
δ ˆ f 0.367** 0.966** 1.432** 0.661** 
  (0.117) (0.122) (0.166) (0.170) 
Pr(δ ˆ f = δ ˆ d )  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
FE    
δ ˆ d -0.030 0.187**  -0.007 0.017 
  (0.035) (0.026) (0.006) (0.009) 
δ ˆ f 0.428** 0.285** 0.152** 0.135 
  (0.073) (0.086) (0.043) (0.077) 
Pr(δ ˆ f = δ ˆ d )  0.000 0.255 0.000 0.127 
FE&FT  
δ ˆ d 0.002 -0.030  0.005 -0.006 
  (0.024) (0.017)  (0.004) (0.008) 
δ ˆ f 0.154** 0.000  0.043  0.030 
  (0.050) (0.068)  (0.041) (0.070) 
Pr(δ ˆ f = δ ˆ d )  0.003 0.662  0.358 0.614 
OLS Wage 
δ ˆ d -0.035 0.049**  0.080**  0.055* 
  (0.020) (0.015) (0.011) (0.017) 
δ ˆ f 0.481** 0.430** 0.391** 0.418** 
  (0.036) (0.050) (0.074) (0.123) 
Pr(δ ˆ f = δ ˆ d )  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 
FE    
δ ˆ d -0.027 -0.023 -0.047**  0.003 
  (0.015) (0.012) (0.008) (0.011) 
δ ˆ f 0.307** 0.235** 0.244** 0.304** 
  (0.033) (0.054) (0.064) (0.095) 
Pr(δ ˆ f = δ ˆ d )  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 
FE&FT  
δ ˆ d -0.045** 0.006  -0.032**  -0.004 
  (0.016) (0.013) (0.007) (0.011) 
δ ˆ f 0.066* 0.116* 0.019  0.079 
  (0.033) (0.057) (0.063) (0.097) 
Pr(δ ˆ f = δ ˆ d )  0.001 0.060 0.419 0.397 
Note:  Foreign = 1 if the majority of the firm's shares are owned by foreigners in year t-1.  Domestic = 1 if 
the firm was private in year t-1 but not majority-owned by foreigners.  FE=specification including firm 
fixed effects; FT= all variables have been detrended using individual firm trends.  Standard errors 
(corrected for firm clustering and for loss of degrees of freedom in the FE&FT specification) are shown in 
parentheses.  The P values for the F test on the difference between the Foreign and Domestic coefficients 
are reported below the foreign standard errors.  The number of observations in each country is the same as 
in Table 5.  * = significant at 5-percent level. ** = significant at 1-percent level. 
 
 
22The estimated coefficients from the dynamic FE and FE&FT specifications for 
employment and the wage rate are plotted in Figures 2 and 3.
22  Results are 
shown separately for domestic and foreign effects and by country.  In each case, 
the general shapes of the FE and FE&FT are usually quite similar.  The 
domestic privatization effects are generally small (less than 10 percent in 
magnitude) in both the pre- and post-privatization periods.  The single exception 
concerns employment in the Romanian FE specification, where the average 
domestic effect three and more years after privatization jumps to 40 percent, 
although this is reduced to 7 percent when FTs are added.  The domestic 
privatization effects exhibit negative trends only for wages in Hungary and 
Russia, but the coefficients are statistically insignificant in the FE&FT 
specification in Russia, and they are small in magnitude in both countries.  The 
graphs also show some pre-privatization increase of wages in Hungary and 
Ukraine, which may reflect anticipatory effects of domestic privatization or 
some form of selection bias. 
                                                 
22 The graphs report only coefficient estimates, and only from FE and FE&FT specifications 
for the wage rate and employment, to save space.  The full set of regression results, including 
standard errors, OLS estimates, and the wage bill, are available on request. 
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Notes:  The graphs present regression coefficients of interactions between dummy variables for the years before and after privatization and an indicator for whether 
the firm is ever domestically privatized (privatization year = 0).  Full sets of unrestricted industry-year dummies are included in the regressions.  FE=specification 
including firm fixed effects; FT= all variables have been detrended using individual firm trends.
 Consistent with the average effects in Table 6, the dynamics of the foreign 
privatization effects show much larger changes compared to the domestic 
effects.  These changes emerge only gradually, however, not as one-time jumps 
just after privatization occurs.  Starting from the privatization year, τ = 0, nearly 
all the effects – for both employment and wages and for all four countries – 
trend upwards, some of them quite strongly.  For example, the FE employment 
effect in Hungary rises from –0.2 at τ = 0 to 0.4 at τ = 3+, and in Romania from 
0.2 to almost 0.6.  The FE&FT results have a similar shape but are much 
smaller in nearly every case, and they are usually statistically insignificant.  In 
no case, however, do the foreign dynamics exhibit negative trends. 
These dynamic specifications are useful for carrying out specification tests on 
pre-privatization behavior, variants of the Heckman-Hotz (1989) pre-program 
tests.  Table 7 shows the results of F  tests of the joint probability that the 
privatization effects one and two years before privatization are different from 
zero.
23  The OLS specifications almost invariably produce large, highly 
significant F statistics.  The sole exception is the foreign effect in the Hungarian 
wage equation, where the F statistic is actually larger in the FE specification 
than the OLS.  The differences between FE and FE&FT pre-program tests are 
more complex, however.  In nine cases, the FE&FT is clearly superior:  the 
domestic effects on employment and wages in Romania and Russia, the foreign 
effects on employment and wages in Hungary and Ukraine, and the foreign 
employment effect in Romania.  But in five other cases the test prefers the FE 
specification:  the domestic employment effect in Ukraine, the domestic wage 
effect in Hungary and Ukraine, and the foreign wage effect in Romania and 
Russia.  In the remaining two cases (domestic employment effect in Hungary 
and foreign employment effect in Russia), the test is not decisive, because all 
the statistics are statistically insignificant, although the test statistics are slightly 
smaller for the FE.   
 
                                                 
23 We also carried out t tests on the effect two years before privatization.  The values of the 
tests and the coefficients (which are plotted in Figures 2 and 3) lead to qualitatively similar 
conclusions as the F tests in Table 7. 
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    ▀     Employment FE       ▲     Employment FE & FT     ▀   Wage FE     ▲     Wage FE & FT 
Notes:  The graphs present regression coefficients of interactions between dummy variables for the years before and after privatization and an indicator for whether 
the firm is ever foreign privatized (privatization year = 0).  Full sets of unrestricted industry-year dummies are included in the regressions.  FE=specification 
including firm fixed effects; FT= all variables have been detrended using individual firm trends. Table 7 
Pre-Program Tests 
 
 Hungary  Romania  Russia  Ukraine 
OLS Employment
Domestic  38.86 18.35  516.10 13.62 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Foreign  12.51 27.69 38.01 12.25 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
FE      
Domestic  0.40 11.54  7.46  0.42 
  (0.672) (0.000) (0.001) (0.656) 
Foreign  5.24 7.31 0.12 4.18 
  (0.005) (0.001) (0.890) (0.015) 
FE&FT  
Domestic  0.66 0.18 2.32 1.66 
  (0.518) (0.834) (0.099) (0.190) 
Foreign  2.09 0.28 0.96 0.02 
  (0.124) (0.752) (0.381) (0.981) 
OLS Wage 
Domestic  3.03 2.72  62.95  10.25 
  (0.049) (0.066) (0.000) (0.000) 
Foreign  0.74 18.51  6.40  3.62 
  (0.478) (0.000) (0.002) (0.027) 
FE      
Domestic  1.24 2.40  27.63 5.85 
  (0.290) (0.091) (0.000) (0.003) 
Foreign  4.61 0.09 0.36 3.41 
  (0.010) (0.914) (0.696) (0.033) 
FE&FT  
Domestic  6.83 1.83 1.97 9.56 
  (0.001) (0.161) (0.140) (0.000) 
Foreign  0.48 2.06 2.57 0.75 
  (0.617) (0.127) (0.076) (0.470) 
Note:. F-Statistics (P–Values) are shown for two hypotheses corresponding to tests of the estimated 
pre-privatization impact of privatization for domestic and foreign ownership, separately:  δ-2d =  δ-1d = 
0, and δ-2f =  δ-1f = 0. 
 
We also carried out F tests on the joint probability that the FEs are all zero and 
on the joint probability that the FTs are all zero.  For each country and each 
dependent variable, these tests were rejected at the 0.0001 level.  Finally, we 
carried out Hausman-type tests of differences in the vectors of estimated 
coefficients from each of the models.  Again, these always rejected equality 
between the OLS and FE coefficients, and between the FE and FE&FT 
coefficients.  Taken together, these tests imply that the OLS specification is 
clearly not preferred. Given the better performance of the FE specification in 
 
 
27some cases, some weight should be placed both on the FE and the FE&FT 
specifications. 
Figure 4: Wage Bill Decomposition
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Figure 5:  Employment Decomposition
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28Our results suggest – contrary to the expectations of many workers, 
policymakers, and economists – that average wages and employment have not 
been substantially reduced by either domestic or foreign privatization.  As we 
discussed in the introduction, however, privatization may affect firm scale and 
efficiency in ways that produce opposing effects on workers.  The lack of 
negative consequences that we find could result from new private owners failing 
to improve efficiency, or it could result from scale effects that offset the 
efficiency effects of private ownership.  To explore these possibilities, we 
employ two decomposition techniques:  first, the wage bill effect is decomposed 
into scale (output) expansion and unit labor cost reduction effects, and second, 
the employment effect is decomposed into scale and productivity effects.  The 
results from specifications including firm-specific trends can be seen in Figures 
4 and 5, with the underlying coefficients and standard errors reported in 
Appendix Table A (along with those from fixed effect specifications). 
A first striking regularity from both figures is that foreign owners have been 
much more active in both dimensions than domestic owners.  This regularity 
holds for the scale effect measured as the effect of privatization on output and 
for both definitions of the efficiency effect (unit labor cost reduction and labor 
productivity increase) within each country.  The scale effect is not only positive 
and significant in each country for foreign privatization, but also for domestic 
privatization with the exception of Russia where it is negative but small in 
magnitude (and statistically insignificant in the FE&FT).  The efficiency effect 
measured as unit labor cost reduction is positive for all countries and both 
ownership forms, although again it is larger under foreign ownership.  The 
effects vary widely across countries:  while the foreign effects are similar for 
Hungary, Romania, and Ukraine, they are substantially smaller in Russia.  But 
the domestic pattern is still more pronounced, as Hungary and Romania show 
sizable scale and efficiency effects of domestic ownership, while both effects 
are negligible in Russia and Ukraine.  Thus, the cross-country domestic wage 
bill patterns (small and negative everywhere) mask large differences in scale 
and efficiency effects.  
The implications from the employment decomposition are similar.  Both 
domestic and foreign privatization raise labor productivity in Hungary, 
Romania, and Ukraine, but only foreign privatization does so in Russia.  Under 
foreign ownership, again, the scale effect always dominates the efficiency 
effect, resulting in a positive net effect on employment.  Domestic ownership, 
on the other hand, creates much smaller scale and efficiency effects that are 
similar in magnitude, resulting in very small net employment effects.  And 
again, there is a pronounced contrast between sizable domestic ownership 




29Comparing the two decompositions, it is apparent that productivity gains have 
been larger than unit labor cost savings, translating into larger wage than 
employment benefits for foreign-firm workers.  This could reflect foreign 
owners’ introduction of new technologies, a change in labor force composition 
in favor of higher-skilled workers, or greater use of efficiency wages, none of 
which, unfortunately, are measurable in our data. 
Finally, we investigate whether the above estimates may be biased due to 
nonrandom exit.  As discussed in Section 2 above, it is difficult to distinguish 
genuine from spurious exits in our data, as in any panel of firms.  As a check, 
however, we estimate exit probits to see whether there are significant 
differences in observed rates across ownership types, as shown in Table 8.  The 
estimated δd and δf are always negative, and tiny everywhere except Hungary.
24  
This implies that our estimates of the effects on workers are lower bounds on 
the true effects, confirming that the hypothesis of a negative effect on workers 




Estimated Effects of Privatization on the Probability of Exit 
 
 Hungary  Romania  Russia  Ukraine 
  δ ˆ d -0.058** -0.003*  -0.002  -0.004** 
  (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
  δ ˆ f  -0.063**  -0.001 -0.007 -0.004* 
  (0.003)  (0.002) (0.009) (0.001) 
R
2 0.091 0.051 0.071 0.128 
Mean  Exit  0.078 0.007 0.045 0.014 
N  13,926 19,316 110,807 49,739 
Note:  Probit marginal effect estimates.  Industry and year dummies are included in the 
regressions.  Private = 1 if the firm is majority private at end of year t-1.  Foreign = 1 if 
the majority of the firm's shares are owned by foreigners in year t-1.  Domestic = 1 if 
the firm was private in year t-1 but not majority-owned by foreigners.  Standard errors 
(corrected for firm clustering) are shown in parentheses.  * = significant at 5-percent 
level. ** = significant at 1-percent level. 
                                                 
24 The Hungarian coefficient should be interpreted in light of a mean exit rate that is also 
much larger than in the other countries.  The higher rate in Hungary may be at least partially 
caused by the bankruptcy law of 1992, which included a trigger mechanism for liquidation if 
the firm did not pay its obligations within a strict time limit.  This procedure, which was 
frequently exploited by managers to buy-in the firm during the liquidation process, might 





Although economic analyses of the effects of privatization have focused almost 
entirely on firm performance, the greatest political and social controversies have 
usually concerned the consequences for the firm’s employees.  In most cases, it 
has been assumed that the employment and wage effects would be negative, and 
workers all around the world have reacted to the prospect of privatization, 
especially that to foreigners, with protests and strikes.  Yet there have been very 
few systematic studies of the relationship between privatization and outcomes 
for the firm’s workers, and previous research has been hampered by small 
sample sizes, short time series, and little ability to control for selection bias.  It 
has therefore remained unclear whether workers’ fears of privatization are in 
fact warranted. 
In this paper, we have analyzed the effects of privatization on the firm’s 
workers using comprehensive data on manufacturing firms in four economies, 
with long time series of annual observations both before and after privatization.  
The data contain similar measurement concepts for the key variables, and we 
have applied consistent econometric procedures to obtain comparable estimates 
across countries.  In particular, we have exploited the longitudinal strength of 
our data and adopted methods commonly employed in the program evaluation 
literature to assess and control for selection bias.  Like most firm-level data, 
ours do not contain information on changes in fringe benefits, worker turnover, 
and the composition of employment, nor can we track the subsequent 
experiences of any workers who happen to be displaced.  Therefore, we cannot 
carry out a complete evaluation of the effects of privatization on worker 
welfare.  But we can address some important components of such an evaluation, 
in particular the consequences for the firm’s wage bill, employment, and wage 
rate. 
Contrary to workers’ expectations, we find no evidence for strong negative 
effects of any form of privatization on any of these variables.  Concerning the 
wage bill, which might be taken as an overall measure of worker welfare, OLS 
estimates of the effect of privatization to domestic owners are negative in 
Hungary and Romania and positive in Russia and Ukraine, but these are subject 
to severe selection bias.  In our fixed effects (FE) and random firm trend 
(FE&FT) models, which are preferred to OLS by several specification tests, a 
statistically significant negative effect on the wage bill emerges only in the case 
of domestic private ownership in Russia, and the magnitude is slight (-3 to -5 
percent). 
By contrast, we estimate that privatization to foreign investors produces 
consistently positive effects on the wage bill in all four countries, regardless of 
 
 
31estimation technique.  The OLS coefficients are very large (0.8–1.8), and while 
they are attenuated in the FE specification (0.4–0.7), they remain highly 
significant.  Adding the firm trends induces further attenuation and, together 
with the small sample sizes in Russia and Ukraine, inhibits precise estimation, 
but the coefficients remain positive everywhere, and they are statistically 
significant in Hungary and Romania (with magnitudes of 0.22 and 0.12, 
respectively). 
Decomposing the effects on the wage bill into separate employment and wage 
effects, we find no evidence of strong negative consequences on either variable.  
Estimated by FE or FE&FT, the employment effects are never negative and 
statistically significant, while for the wage rate they are significantly negative 
only in Hungary and Russia, but small in magnitude (-3 to -5 percent in both 
countries).  The estimated coefficients on foreign ownership again stand in stark 
contrast, with signs that are uniformly positive for all countries and both 
dependent variables.  The magnitudes of the foreign effects are consistently 
large and statistically significant in the OLS and FE specifications.  For 
employment, only in Hungary does this result remain under FE&FT, while for 
wages, it remains for both Hungary and Romania.  Our estimated dynamic 
effects around the privatization year show only minor fluctuations in the 
domestic effects before and after privatization, while the foreign effects tend to 
grow strongly and consistently from the privatization year onwards. 
We explore possible explanations for these patterns by considering two 
alternative mechanisms through which privatization may affect outcomes for 
workers:  efficiency and scale.  Our decomposition analysis of the wage bill into 
output and unit labor cost and of employment into output and labor productivity 
shows that domestic privatization has tended to produce gains in scale (output) 
and efficiency (unit labor cost and labor productivity) that have offset each 
other in their consequences for workers.  In Hungary and Romania, however, 
these offsetting scale and efficiency effects have both been large, while in 
Russia and Ukraine they have been small.  Foreign privatization has resulted in 
much larger efficiency effects in all four countries, but still much larger scale 
effects, resulting in the increased employment and wages in foreign-owned 
firms that we observe after privatization. 
These cross-country and domestic versus foreign patterns are inconsistent with 
the trade-off in privatization between efficiency and worker welfare that has 
been assumed by many economists (e.g., Aghion and Blanchard, 1998).  In our 
data, efficiency-enhancing owners appear to be good for workers, at least in 
terms of average employment and wage levels.  Greater efficiency helps firms 
expand sales, reducing the likelihood of severe distress and raising labor 
demand.  We find that workers’ employment and wage prospects are never 
substantially diminished by privatization, and in some cases – particularly with 
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